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INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 2001, two high-profile murder cases, both
involving defendants who were minors when they committed their
crimes, produced tie votes of three-to-three in courts of last resort.
One involved Samuel Manzie, who, at the age of fifteen, killed an
eleven-year-old boy named Eddie Werner when he came to Manzie's
door selling candy.1 Against the advice of his lawyer and his
family, Manzie, himself the victim of sexual abuse by a pedophile,
pleaded guilty to murder.2 He was sentenced to seventy years
of imprisonment, with no eligibility for parole until he had served
nearly sixty years.3 The Appellate Division of the New Jersey
Superior Court affirmed the seventy-year sentence, but reduced the
parole ineligibility period to thirty years, reasoning that New
Jersey's No Early Release Act, upon which the trial court had relied
in setting the parole ineligibility period, did not apply to murder.'
The Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed by a vote of three-to-
three.5
The second involved Napoleon Beazley, who, at the age of
seventeen, stole a car by killing its driver, John Luttig.8 Beazley,
the president of his senior class with no prior criminal record,7 was
convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death.' The Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected Beazley's contention that the
Eighth Amendment and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights bar the execution of someone who was a minor at
1. New Jersey v. Manzie, 762 A.2d 276 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000). For a more
detailed factual account, see Laura Mansnerus, Eddie Was Murdered. Sam's Doing 70 Years.
But Who Is to Blame?, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 8, 1999, § 14 (New Jersey Weekly Desk), at 1.
2. Mansnerus, supra note 1.
3. Manzie, 762 A.2d at 277.
4. Id. at 282.
5. State v. Manzie, 773 A.2d 659,659 (N.J. 2001) (per curiam). Justice Verniero recused
himself.
6. Beazley v. Johnson, 242 F.3d 248, 253-55 (5th Cir. 2001) (describing the
circumstances of the crime, including testimony that Beazley "wanted to see what it [was]
like to kill somebody," and his unsuccessful attempt also to kill Mrs. Luttig).
7. See Defy Death; In Appeals of Capital Cases, Judges Tie Votes Should Work in Favor
of the Condemned, NEWSDAY, Aug. 17, 2001, at A48 [hereinafter Defy Death].
8. Beazley, 242 F.3d at 253.
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the time of the crime.9 Beazley's application for a stay of execution
pending certiorari was denied on a tie vote by the Supreme Court
of the United States.'0
The New Jersey Supreme Court decision in Manzie has been
criticized f6r failing to resolve the important legal issue in-
volved." The United States Supreme Court decision in Beazley
has been assailed on the ground that "[a] tie shouldn't go to the
executioner." 2
In this Article, I defend the traditional practice of the Supreme
Court of the United States and respond to various suggestions for
avoiding or breaking ties in the Court, but recommend a statutory
change dealing with stays of execution upon the grant of certiorari.
In a companion article, I explore the state law provisions for
9. Id. at 263-69. Four Justices have recently urged the Court to revisit the Eighth
Amendment question. In re Stanford, No. 01-10009 (Oct. 21, 2002) (Stevens, Souter,
Ginsburg, Breyer, JJ., dissenting from denial of stay of execution).
10. Beazley v. Johnson, 533 U.S. 969 (2001). The application was made to Justice Scalia
as Circuit Justice for the Fifth Circuit. He recused himself, resulting in the distribution of
the application to Justice Kennedy, the next Justice in order of seniority. See SUP. CT. R. 22.3
(providing that when the appropriate Circuit Justice is unavailable for any reason, the
application is distributed to the "Justice then available who is next junior to the Circuit
Justice"). Justice Kennedy, as is common on an application to stay an execution, referred the
application to the full Court. See ROBERT L. STERN ETAL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE § 17.20
(8th ed. 2002). The Court denied the application on a three-to-three vote, with Justices
Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer voting to grant the application, and Justices Scalia, Souter,
and Thomas recused. Beazley, 533 U.S. at 969. Evidently, Justices Scalia, Souter, and
Thomas recused themselves because of their relationship with United States Circuit Judge
J. Michael Luttig, the son of the murder victim. See Raymond Bonner, Three Abstain as
Supreme Court Declines to Halt Texas Execution, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2001, at Al. The
petition for certiorari was later denied without recorded dissent. Beazley v. Cockrell, 533
U.S. 969 (2001).
11. Brief in Support of Motion for Rehearing at 3, State v. Manzie (June 15, 2001) (No.
50,608) (seeking rehearing and arguing that"litigants before this Court deserve no less" than
a majority opinion "in a case of this magnitude"); When Is "Necessary"F, N.J. L.J., Aug. 20,
2001, at 18 (describing the concurring opinion issued by three justices in Manzie as "either
the law to be followed or an interesting academic exercise" and calling for a full complement
of justices to avoid an evenly divided court); see also Thomas E. Baker, Why We Call the
Supreme Court 'Supreme," 4 GREEN BAG 2d 129 (2001) (criticizing equal divisions in the
Supreme Court of the United States for the same reason).
12. Bonner, supra note 10 (quoting George Kendall of the NAACP Legal Defense and
Education Fund, Inc.); see also Defy Death, supra note 7 (asserting that "under court rules,
a tie is a win for the executioner," and arguing that "court officials should change the rule
about ties in capital cases"); Hanging Crimes? Teen Killer, Dozing Lawyer Try Texans on
Death Penalty, HOUSTON CHRON., Aug. 16,2001, at A26 (stating that"[ulnder Supreme Court
rules, a tie goes to the prosecution").
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temporary assignments to the Supreme Court of New Jersey, a
mechanism that has been suggested as a way to avoid or break
ties, and argue as a matter of state constitutional law that such
assignments should only be made when necessary to make a
quorum. 1
3
I. THE INABILITY TO REPLACE AN ABSENT OR RECUSED JUSTICE
The traditional practice of the Supreme Court of the United
States is that "no affirmative action can be had in a cause where the
judges are equally divided in opinion as to the judgment to be
rendered or order to be made."1' Although equal divisions on today's
nine-member Court result from recusals, absences, or vacancies,
such equal divisions can result on a full bench if Congress sets the
size of the Supreme Court at an even number, as it did from 1789
until 1807,'r and from 1863 until 1866.16
There is no provision in federal law for temporarily replacing a
Supreme Court Justice, even if the result is the absence of a
quorum of six Justices.' While circuit and district judges may be
13. Edward A. Hartnett, Ties in the Supreme Court of New Jersey, 32 SErONHALLL. REV.
(forthcoming 2002).
14. Durant v. Essex Co., 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 107, 111 (1868). The rule of four, a
nonmajoritarian rule which empowers four Justices to grant certiorari, is an obvious
exception to this majority rule-based principle. The rule of four is discussed below. See infra
notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
15. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 1, 1 Stat. 73 (setting the number of Justices at six).
It was increased to seven by the Act of Feb. 24, 1807, ch. 17, § 5, 2 Stat. 421. Compare
Bonner, supra note 10 (stating that "[liegal scholars said the court now found itself in a
situation that the founding fathers hoped to avoid by creating a Supreme Court with an odd
number of members"), with Corrections, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2001, at A2 ("The number of
justices is set by Congress. It was not specified as an odd number by the founders. The
original court had six members."). The Judiciary Act of 1801, § 3, 2 Stat. 89, called for a
reduction from six to five upon the next vacancy, but the Act was repealed before any such
vacancy occurred. Act of Mar. 8, 1802, 2 Stat. 132.
16. Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 100, § 1, 12 Stat. 794 (setting the number of Justices at ten).
This number was decreased to seven by the Act of July 23, 1866, § 1, 14 Stat. 209 and
increased to nine by the Act of Apr. 10, 1869, ch. 22, § 1, 16 Stat 44. Although the decrease
in 1866 was designed to deny President Andrew Johnson any appointments to the Court, one
explanation offered at the time was to avoid tie votes that resulted from an even number. See
William H. Rehnquist, Address, The Supreme Court: 'The First Hundred Years Were the
Hardest,' 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 475, 486 (1988).
17. 28 U.S.C. § 1 (2000). In most cases, the absence of a quorum will result in an "order
affirming the judgment .... with the same effect as upon affirmance by an equally divided
646
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temporarily assigned to other circuits or districts, there is no
authority for their temporary assignment to the Supreme Court.18
Indeed, the statute authorizing the assignment of retired district
and circuit judges to judicial duties specifically excludes assign-
ments to the Supreme Court.'9
The closest thing to a temporary assignment to the Supreme
Court is a recess appointment, whereby the President can "fill up
all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by
granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next
Session."20 This, of course, is (at best) only available to deal with
vacancies, and only when the Senate is in recess; it is not available
to deal with recusals or other temporary absences.
Professor Steven Lubet, however, has asserted that "there would
appear to be no statutory impediment to a Court rule (or practice)
that calls upon retired Justices to participate in certain votes,"
because retired Justices "retain the office" upon retirement.21 Lubet
overlooks that "[n]o retired Justice or judge shall perform judicial
duties except when designated and assigned,"22 and that the tasks
Court." Id. § 2109. See, e.g., United States v. Hatter, 519 U.S. 801 (1996) (affuming pursuant
to § 2109).
The quorum statute is a neglected example of the breadth of congressional power to make
all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution the judicial power. See U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 18. By setting a supermajority quorum requirement, Congress not only prevents
binding precedent from being established by three Justices in a three to two decision, but
also prevents even a unanimous majority of the Court from acting in a five to zero decision.
18. See 28 U.S.C. § 291 (2000) (authorizing the Chief Justice to temporarily assign circuit
judges to another circuit and the chiefjudge of a circuit to assign a circuit judge to a district
court within the circuit); id. § 292 (2000) (authorizing the chief judge of a circuit to
temporarily assign district judges within the circuit to a court of appeals or to other districts
in the circuit, and authorizing the Chief Justice to temporarily assign district judges for
service in another circuit, either in a district court or a court of appeals).
19. Id. § 294(d) (2000) ("No such designation or assignment shall be made to the Supreme
Court.").
20. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3.
21. Steven Lubet, Disqualification of Supreme Court Justices: The Certiorari
Conundrum, 80 MINN. L. REV. 657, 675 n.82 (1996) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 371(b)(1) (Supp. V
1993)). Lubet's specific proposal is for retired Justices to participate in certiorari decisions
to replace recused Justices. Id. at 675-76.
22. 28 U.S.C. § 294(e) (2000); see Steckel v. Lurie, 185 F.2d 921, 923 (6th Cir. 1950)
(holding that a retired judge of a district court needed a designation and assignment to
perform judicial duties even in his district of appointment, because of this "plain and
unambiguous language"); cf Booth v. United States, 291 U.S. 339, 351 (1934) (stating that,
under then-existing judicial retirement law, a district judge did not need an assignment to
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to which a retired Justice may be assigned are limited to "judicial
duties in any circuit, including those of a circuit justice."23 When
Congress in 1937 extended the judicial retirement statute to
Supreme Court Justices, both proponents and opponents made clear
that this provision was designed to prohibit retired Justices from
participating in Supreme Court cases. The Report of the House
Judiciary Committee could not be clearer: "Under the terms of
this bill a retired Justice would be relieved from regular active
service. He would no longer sit in the Supreme Court, by assign-
ment or otherwise, and a successor to him on that Court would be
appointed."24
The same understanding was manifest in the Senate. As Senator
McCarran explained in presenting the bill:
What would be the status of a Justice of the Supreme Court who
might take advantage of this law if it should be enacted? The
status would be that he would have retired from the Supreme
Bench but would still retain his status as an inactive judge,
hold court in his own district) (citing Maxwell v. United States, 3 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1925),
affd 271 U.S. 647 (1925)); Emily Field Van Tassel, Resignations and Removals: A History of
Federal Judicial Service and Disservice-17891992, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 333,398 (1993) ("In
1937, Supreme Court justices were given the same choice between retiring or resigning that
other life-term judges had been given in 1919").
23. 28 U.S.C. § 294(a) (2000). The original Act provided:
Be it enacted ... That Justices of the Supreme Court are hereby granted the
same rights and privileges with regard to retiring, instead of resigning, granted
to judges other than Justices of the Supreme Court ... and the President shall
be authorized to appoint a successor to any such Justice of the Supreme Court
so retiring from regular active service on the bench, but such Justice of the
Supreme Court so retired may nevertheless be called upon by the Chief Justice
and be by him authorized to perform such judicial duties, in any judicial circuit,
including those of a circuit justice in such circuit, as such retired Justice may
be willing to undertake.
Act of Mar. 1, 1937, ch. 21, 50 Stat. 24. The House had rejected such a bill in 1935, but
Congress passed it in 1937 within five days after President Roosevelt announced his court-
packing plan. See Barry Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court, 80 VA. L. REV. 201,214-
15 (1994).
24. H.R. REP. No. 176, at 1 (1937). This statement was not buried by some staff member
in some long-winded report that no one in Congress would read. The entire report is but a
single page. It consists of three paragraphs, including the formulaic paragraph reciting that
the bill was referred, considered, and is being reported with a recommendation that it pass.
Id.; see also H.R. REP. No. 212, at 1 (1935) ("When retired, they remain eligible to discharge
such casual duties in any circuit as they may be assigned by the Chief Justice and be willing
to undertake. They could not sit in the Supreme Court.").
648
20021 TIES IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 649
subject to call which he himself might accept or not accept into
the circuits or other courts lower than the Supreme Court.2"
In opposing the bill, Senator Burke stated that it was "not quite
accurate" to say that the bill merely extended to the Supreme Court
Justices the retirement provisions already in effect for circuit and
district judges.28 He noted that retired judges may continue to sit in
their court of appointment, but that
[the] bill before us provides, distinct from that, that any member
of the Supreme Court who should retire under this provision of
the law could under no circumstances be recalled for duty on the
Supreme Court, but would be subject to call-true, at his own
will--only in a different orbit altogether, in the lower courts. So
I think there is a vital distinction between the pending bill and
the existing statute.27
25. 81 CONG. REc. 1645 (1937) (statement of Sen. McCarran).
26. Id. at 1646 (statement of Sen. Burke).
27. Id. Justice Van Devanter quickly took advantage of this statute and retired in June
of 1937. Indeed, if Supreme Court Justices had been able, like lower court judges, to retire
with a guaranteed income rather than simply resign and face the risk that Congress would
cut their pension, Justice Van Devanter might have retired earlier and the Court-packing
crisis may have never materialized. See Cushman, supra note 23, at 214 (noting that it was
widely rumored that Justices Van Devanter and Sutherland had wanted to retire but were
discouraged because Congress had reduced Justice Holmes' pension after he resigned); Paul
Freund, Charles Evans Hughes as Chief Justice, 81 HARV. L. REV. 4, 23 n.64 (1967) (same);
Richard D. Friedman, Switching Time and Other Thought Experiments: The Hughes Court
and Constitutional Transformation, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1891, 1899 n.26 (1994). According to
Friedman:
[Niot until 1937 were Justices given the privilege of retiring and retaining their
salaries, and the consequent financial pressure kept Justice Van Devanter on
the Court longer than he would otherwise have been. Van Devanter's
retirement in 1937 greatly contributed to the defeat of Roosevelt's Court-
packing plan.... An earlier retirement might have averted the crisis altogether.
Id.
When President Roosevelt nominated Senator Hugo Black to the Supreme Court, the
Senate revisited the meaning of the retirement statute in the course of debating whether
Black was eligible for the appointment. See John F. O'Connor, The Emoluments Clause: An
Anti-Federalist Intruder in a Federalist Constitution, 24 HOFSTRA L. REV. 89, 112 (1995)
(recounting the Senate debate and noting that the 1937 statute "permitted a retired Justice
to hear cases within a judicial circuit, but did not permit retirees to hear cases before the
Supreme Court"); see also 81 CONG. REc. 9076 (1937) (statement of Sen. Burke) (remarking
that retired Justice Van Devanter gave up "his active duties on the Supreme Court
altogether, and on the inferior courts serving only to the extent to which he elects); id. at
9078 (statement of Sen. McGill) (stating that retired Justice Van Devanter "cannot exercise
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II. THE WIDESPREAD AND LONGSTANDING PRACTICE OF
AFFIRMANCE BY AN EQUALLY DIVIDED COURT HAS BEEN
ENDORSED BY CONGRESS
Professor Thomas Baker has explicitly criticized the Court's
practice of affirmance by an equally divided Court, using the case
of Free v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc. ,' as his target. Indeed, although
there was nothing the Supreme Court could have done to replace
the recused Justice O'Connor in Free, Baker has written that
he "would give the Justices a 'C-' for their effort, or lack of effort"
in that case.' In his view, the rule of affirmance by an equally
divided Court is "an internal procedural finesse ... not required by
the Constitution or by any statute."30 He contrasts the rule of
affirmance by an equally divided Court with the rule of four,
pursuant to which a petition for certiorari is granted if four Justices
vote to grant. He describes the rule of four as part of the mutual
understanding between Congress and the Justices, but claims
"the rule of affirmance by an equally divided Court has not been
blessed by Congress," and therefore, the Court is free to "ignore"
it.3' Although he contends that the Court could adopt the contrary
rule of reversal by an equally divided Court, his preferred alter-
native is that "[slomeone on the Court [be] willing to compromise
and change his or her vote to settle an important issue and to move
the policy question back to Congress."32
any of the functions of Justice of the Supreme Court of the Untied States"); id. at 9082
(statement of Sen. Barkley) (arguing that retired Justice Van Devanter 'cannot voluntarily
go back and sit on the Supreme Court in any case"); id. (statement of Sen. Connally) (stating
that "[ulnder the express terms of this statute, Mr. Justice Van Devanter cannot go back on
the Supreme Court Bench").
28. 529 U.S. 333 (2000) (per curiam).
29. Baker, supra note 11, at 129. For a very different criticism of Free, see John B.
Oakley, Joinder and Jurisdiction in the Federal District Courts: The State of the Union of
Rules and Statutes, 69 TENN. L. REV. 35, 50 n.80 (2001) (expressing distress that four
members of the Court were evidently willing to affirm notwithstanding that the court of
appeals had resolved an issue not properly before it).
30. Baker, supra note 11, at 130.
31. Id. at 130-31.
32. Id. Although his suggestion of a rule of reversal by an equally divided Court may be
tongue-in-cheek, it is fair to observe that the rule of aflirmance by an equally divided Court
may rest in part on an assumption that a lower court's decision is more likely to be correct
than incorrect. The empirical evidence for this proposition, at least in the context of
[Vol. 44:643650
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Baker is wrong to assert that Congress has not endorsed the rule
of affirmance by an equally divided Court. Indeed, its endorsement
of that rule is clearer than its endorsement of the rule of four. The
rule of four appears in no statute, but rather was one of the
methods of handling petitions for certiorari that the Justices, when
they lobbied Congress to give the Justices greater discretionary
control over their docket, assured Congress they would continue to
use.33 Although I am pleased that the Court haskept its promise
regarding the rule of four, it has not kept the other promises given
to Congress at the time,3 4 and at least one Justice has suggested
abandoning even the rule of four.35
In contrast, the rule of affirmance by an equally divided Court
does appear in the federal judicial code:
If a case brought to the Supreme Court by direct appeal from a
district court cannot be heard and determined because of the
absence of a quorum of qualified justices, the Chief Justice of the
mandatory appellate jurisdiction, is overwhelming. For example, the courts of appeals, on
average, reversed 9.5% of the decisions they reviewed in the twelve-month period ending
September 30,2000. ADMIN. OFFICE OFTHE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BusINEss OF THE UNITED
STATES COURTS 2000, Table B-5 (2000), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2000/
appendices/b05sepOO.pdf (last visited Aug. 28, 2002); see also Timothy P. Glynn, Discontent
and Indiscretion: Discretionary Review of Interlocutory Orders, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 175,
235 (2001) (noting that the reversal rate "for all matters in the federal courts is probably
somewhere between fourteen and twenty percent"). Indeed, it would be rather distressing
to learn that lower courts were wrong more often than they were right. Cf James S. Leibman
et al., Capital Attrition: Error Rates in Capital Cases 1973-1995, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1839, 1850
(2000) (reporting that in capital cases between 1973 and 1995, sixty-eight percent of death
sentences were reversed on either direct review, state habeas, or federal habeas). A court
with the discretionary power to control its own jurisdiction is, of course, likely to produce a
higher reversal rate. Moreover, in many cases a rule of reversal by an equally divided Court
would be completely indeterminate: the reversed court would frequently have no idea what
it should do after the reversal.
33. See Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years
After the Judges'Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1643,1674-90 (2000). For a judicial opinion stating
the rule of four, see Rice v. Sioux City Meml Park Cemetery, 349 U.S. 70, 74 (1955) (noting
that "certiorari was granted, according to our practice, because at least four members of the
Court" viewed certiorari as warranted).
34. Hartnett, supra note 33, at 1705 (noting that "the Justices assured Congress that
certiorari is always granted when there is a conflict between courts of appeals and would
always be granted when there was an arguable constitutional claim"); John Paul Stevens,
The Life Span of a Judge-Made Rule, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 10-14 (1983) (describing the
changes in certiorari practice).
35. Stevens, supra note 34, at 14.
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
United States may order it remitted to the court of appeals for
the circuit including the district in which the case arose ....
In any other case brought to the Supreme Court for review,
which cannot be heard and determined because of the absence
of a quorum of qualified justices, if a majority of the qualified
justices shall be of opinion that the case cannot be heard and
determined at the next ensuing term, the court shall enter its
order affirming the judgment of the court from which the case
was brought for review with the same effect as upon affirmance
by an equally divided Court."
Although it is true that it is not an explicit congressional
requirement that the Supreme Court utilize the rule of affirmance
by an equally divided Court, it clearly represents Congress'
awareness and endorsement of that rule. Indeed, by requiring that
an affirmance for lack of a quorum have the "same effect" as an
" affirmance by an equally divided court," 7 Congress presupposed
the existence of the rule of affirmance by an equally divided Court.
Congress was wise to presuppose the existence of the rule of
affirmance by an equally divided Court. The rule is not some
idiosyncratic practice of the Supreme Court of the United States,
but an application of a broader principle that applies generally in
multimember bodies governed by majority rule: the body cannot
take any affirmative action based on a tie." As Justice Field
36. 28 U.S.C. § 2109 (2000). If a case is remitted to the court of appeals, that court will
either sit in banc or be "specially constituted and composed of the three circuit judges senior
in commission who are able to sit," and its decision "shall be final and conclusive."Id. Judith
Resnik has referred to this as a method of"reconstituting the United States Supreme Court."
Judith Resnick, On the Bias: Feminist Reconsiderations of the Aspirations for Our Judges,
61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1877,1892 n.53 (1988). This statement, however, is inaccurate. The circuit
judges who decide such a case do not sit temporarily on the Supreme Court or issue
judgments or opinions in the name of that Court. Instead, the statute creates an exception
to an exception: In the vast msjority of cases, appeals from district courts are heard by
regional courts of appeals; in some exceptional cases, appeals are routed directly to the
Supreme Court, but if the Supreme Court cannot hear such an exceptional case, the case is
routed back to the regional court of appeals, with statutory direction as to the composition
of any panel.
37. 28 U.S.C. § 2109.
38. There is even a Latin maxim, semper praesumitur pro negante, that is, it is always
to be presumed in favor of the negative. See Horace Binney Wallace, note, following Krebs
v. Carlisle Bank, 14 F. Cas. 856, 862, 2 Wall. Jr. 33 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1850) (No. 7,932) (Grier,
Circuit Justice) (quoting Queens v. Millis, 10 Clark & F. 534) [hereinafter Wallace, Krebs
note]. At the argument of Durant v. Essex Co., 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 107, 111 (1868), the leading
652 [Vol. 44:643
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explained in the 1868 case of Durant v. Essex Co.: "It has long been
the doctrine in this country and in England, where courts consist of
several members, that no affirmative action can be had in a cause
where the judges are equally divided in opinion as to the judgment
to be rendered or order to be made." 9
The Supreme Court applied this broader principle from the very
beginning. In 1792, the Attorney General made a motion in the
Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to the Circuit Court for the
District of Pennsylvania commanding that court to hear and decide
a petition filed by William Hayburn. The Supreme Court divided
evenly on the question whether the Attorney General had the
authority to make such a motion ex officio, and accordingly denied
the motion.' Hayburn's Case is sometimes cited as the first
instance in the Supreme Court of an affirmance by an equally
divided Court,"1 but this description is somewhat anachronistic. The
Court did not purport to review and affirm a judgment, it simply
denied a motion. Hayburn's Case was decided a decade before
Marbury v. Madison,"2 and the Court in Hayburn's Case did not
pause to ask whether the Attorney General's motion called for an
exercise of original or appellate jurisdiction; the basic principle that
an evenly divided Court could not take affirmative action applied
regardless."
Supreme Court case regarding affirmance by an equally divided Court, Justice Grier
interrupted the argument to refer counsel to the Wallace note, describing the note as "clear
and satisfactory." See generally THE LAW DICTIONARY 363 (7th ed. 1997) (translating the
maxim as 'the presumption is always in favor of the negative").
39. Durant, 74 U.S. at 110; see also Bridges v. Tunnel, 2 Del. Cas. 451 (1818) (affirming,
by an equally divided Court, judgment of freedom for a slave who was sold with intent to
export).
40. Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408 (1792).
41. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 11, at 130.
42. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (holding that mandamus to an executive official would
constitute an exercise of original jurisdiction and that Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789
was an unconstitutional attempt to add to the Court's original jurisdiction). Post-Marbury,
mandamus to an inferior court is conceptualized as an exercise of appellate jurisdiction. See
Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943); James E. Pfander, Jurisdiction-Stripping and the
Supreme Court's Power to Supervise Inferior Tribunals, 78 TEx L. REV. 1433, 1440-93 (2000);
James E. Pfander, Marbury, Original Jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court's Supervisory
Powers, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1515, 1591-92 (2001).
43. See, e.g., Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420, 538 (1837)
(noting that the state trial court was equally divided and dismissing the bill seeking an
injunction).
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It is this broader principle that the Supreme Court applied in the
Beazley case: Once Justice Kennedy referred the application for a
stay to the full Court, the Court could not take affirmative action on
a tie vote." Because granting the application for a stay would
constitute affirmative action, the tie resulted in a denial of the
application. Contrary to the claims of some critics, a tie does not go
to the executioner. Instead, a tie goes to whoever does not need
affirmative Court action. In particular, if a lower court issues a stay
of execution, and the state applies to vacate the stay, a tie vote
would result in the application being denied and the stay remaining
in place. 5 Indeed, if a Circuit Justice were to grant a stay of
execution himself, the full Court could not vacate that stay on a tie
vote.46
The broader principle applies in legislative bodies as well as
courts. In Professor Saul Levmore's description of parliamentary
law, he notes that a tie "will defeat the motion because of the
ancient rule that a motion needs a majority to pass."4 7 Congress is
44. See Beazley, 533 U.S. at 969; see also Buckley v. Valeo, 423 U.S. 1040, 1040 (1975)
(denying injunction pending appeal by a four-to-four vote); Byrne v. PBIC, Inc., 398 U.S. 916,
916 (1970) (denying stay by a four-to-four vote).
45. In the past, the Court might have been more deferential to lower court decisions
granting stays of execution than to decisions denying stays of execution, but in recent years
the Court has certainly been willing to vacate a lower court's stay of execution. See, e.g.,
Snyderv. Weeks, 531 U.S. 1003, 1003 (2000); Lewis v. Harding, 503 U.S. 967,967-68 (1992);
Delo v. Stokes, 495 U.S. 320,322 (1990) (per curiam). See generally STERN ETAL., supra note
10, § 17.20.
46. See STERN ETAL., supra note 10, §§ 17.16, 17.18.
47. Saul Levmore, Parliamentary Law, Majority Decisionmaking, and the Voting
Paradox, 75 VA. L. REV. 971, 1010 (1989). It is possible that the principle can be traced as far
back as the scene in Aeschylus' Eumenides, a scene "plainly meant to signal the beginning
of both democracy and the reign of law," where Athena's vote to acquit might have created
a tie, and hence an acquittal. Id. at 974; see 2 THE ORESTEIA OF AESCHYLUS 228 (George
Thomson ed., 1966); Wallace, Krebs note, supra note 38, at 862 ('An equal division of a court
of error, on a question of reversing a judgment, is like a tie vote in a legislative assembly on
a question of enacting or repealing a law.*). See generally United States v. Ba~lin, 144 U.S.
1, 6 (1892) (stating "the general rule of all parliamentary bodies is that, when a quorum is
present, the act of a majority ... is the act of the body"); Brett W. King, Deconstructing
Gordon and Contingent Legislative Authority: The Constitutionality of Supermajority Rules,
6 U. Cm. L. SCH. ROUNiYrABLE 133, 182 n.224 (1999) (citing Blackstone, Locke, Jefferson, and
others for the proposition that '[ulnder well established Common Law rules, majority rule
(as to both quorum and voting) is the default rule of decision and procedure in all legislative
bodies"). Indeed, the default rule of majority rule in legislative bodies is so powerful that
there is considerable debate concerning the constitutionality of imposing supermajority
requirements by rule in either the House or the Senate. See, e.g., id. at 136 n.14 (citing
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well aware of this rule because it governs Congress itself. A tie in
the House of Representatives means that the bill or motion is
defeated.4" The same is true in the Senate4 9 if the*Vice President
does not cast a tie-breaking vote."0 It applies in state legislatures as
well: Indeed, the very premise of Coleman v. Miller was that if the
Lieutenant Governor of Kansas were not authorized to cast a tie-
breaking vote in favor of ratification of an amendment to the United
States Constitution then the tie would result in the defeat of that
state's ratification.5'
In parliamentary bodies, the principle can have the unfortunate
result of making the outcome depend on how the question is
framed.52 A similar problem can sometimes arise in courts
contributions on both sides of the debate).
48. See John C. Yoo, Kosovo, War Powers, and the Multilateral Future, 148 U. PA. L. REv.
1673, 1681 (2000) (noting that the House "rejected, by a tie 213 to 213 vote, the March 23
Senate resolution authorizing the use of force" in Yugoslavia).
49. See, e.g., Proceedings of the 46th Jud. Conf. of the D.C. Circuit, 111 F.R.D. 91, 150
(1985) (reporting the rejection of a budget resolution "by a 49/49 tie vote"); William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J.
331, 393 n.188 (1991) (stating that the "Senate defeated the floor amendment upon a tie
vote") (citing 118 CONG. REC. 3373, 3965 (1972)); Aaron F. Marcus, Note, Evidence-Diggs
v. Lyons: The Use of Prior Criminal Convictions to Impeach Credibility in Civil Actions
Under Rule 609(A), 60 TUL. L. REv. 863, 866 n.16 (1986) (stating that the "Senate rejected
the amendment by a tie vote and then passed it upon reconsideration"); Brett McDonnell,
Comment, Dynamic Statutory Interpretations and Sluggish Social Movements, 85 CAL. L.
REV. 919, 930 (1997) (noting that an "amendment passed in the House, failed on a tie vote
in the Senate, and was not adopted in the Conference Committee").
50. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 4 (providing that the "Vice President of the United
States shall be President of the Senate, but shall have no vote, unless they be equally
divided").
51. 307 U.S. 433, 446 (1939) (holding that "the twenty senators whose votes, if their
contention were sustained, would have been sufficient to defeat the resolution ratifying the
proposed constitutional amendment, have an interest in the controversy which ... is sufficient
to give the Court jurisdiction"); see Edward J. Larson, "In the Finest, Most Womanly Way:"
Women in the Southern Eugenics Movement, 39 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 119, 137 (1995) (noting
that a bill "lost without debate on a tie vote" in the Louisiana state Senate); see also Lynn
Smith, An Equality Approach to Reproductive Choice: R. v. Sullivan, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM
93, 99 n.31 (1991) (noting that in the Canadian Senate a bill to recriminalize abortion "was
defeated by a tie vote").
52. Levmore, supra note 47, at 1010 (noting that if the chair is given a "deliberative" vote,
like any other member, then the "motion's defeat by way of a tie vote is unattractive, in part,
because the defeat hinges on a procedural point (that the chair might control); a conversely
framed motion might also have failed"). Levmore also observes that ties can be avoided by
giving the chair a casting vote, but that this often gives the chair less power than desired;
or by giving the chair both a deliberative vote and a casting vote, but that this often gives the
chair more power than desired; so the "standard rule ... gives the chair only a deliberative
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exercising original jurisdiction, where the result of an equal division
depends on what is understood to constitute affirmative action, or,
put slightly differently, which judicial procedures are understood
to happen as a matter of course and which are not. A dramatic
example of this occurred in an 1896 Delaware murder trial
conducted with four judges and a jury.5" Three workers at the state
insane asylum were prosecuted for their roles in the death of an
inmate at the asylum. The judges divided evenly on a defense
objection to the competency of another inmate to testify as a
witness and denied the objection.54 The jury convicted two of the
defendants, who moved for a new trial and an arrest of judgment.
Once again, the judges divided equally, and both motions were
denied.' In an evident attempt to frame the question so that an
even division would benefit the defendants, defense counsel
contended that "it was necessary for the attorney general to make
a motion that sentence be passed," but the court unanimously
overruled this point.6 Finally, defense counsel argued that because
the motion in arrest ofjudgment raised the question ofjurisdiction,
and the court divided equally, "no judgment could be pronounced,"
but this motion did not prevail either and the defendants were
sentenced. 7 If a motion were required to admit testimony, or to
pass sentence, then the equal divisions would have produced the
contrary result.
vote, thus creating some unresolved ties and making the form of the original motion matter."
Id. at 1011. In practice, most chairs with a deliberative vote refrain from exercising them to
create ties, thus "suppress[ing] the fact that the form of the original motion matters." Id.
53. State v. Brown, 36 A. 458 (Del. Ct. of Oyer & Terminer 1896).
54. Id. at 463 ("The court being equally divided, the witness, of course, is admitted.").
55. Id. at 465-66, 469.
56. Id. at 471.
57. Id. In passing sentence, the judge took the time to explain to the defendants how
these equal divisions resulted in the admission of the contested testimony and the overruling
of the defendants' post-verdict motions, noting "(tlhat a divided court should produce this
result is not new or surprising, in this state or elsewhere." Id. at 471-72. A similar analysis
may explain the willingness of Justice Chase to pronounce sentence for a common law crime
in United States v. Worrall, 2 U.S. 384 (1798), despite his view that there is no federal
common law of crimes, for in that case the jury had convicted and the Court divided evenly
on the defendant's motion in arrest ofjudgment. Cf WILLIAM R. CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT
IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC 147 (1995) (quoting a letter from District Judge Peters claiming that
he "deluded" Chase by suggesting a mild sentence and that Chase "did not see, 'till too late,
that he had pronounced judgment with a divided court").
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On occasion, this difficulty arises in the exercise of the original
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States. For
example, in 1952, the Court issued a rule to show cause why
Abraham Isserman should not be disbarred, pursuant to its rule
that a member of its bar who is disbarred in another court "will be
disbarred" from the Supreme Court unless "he shows good cause to
the contrary.""8 The Court divided equally regarding whether
Isserman had met his burden of showing good cause, and, lacking
a majority conclusion that he had met his burden, disbarred him in
accordance with the terms of its prior order.59 To conclude, as the
Court did without apparent dissent, that the equal division resulted
in Isserman's disbarment depended on an understanding that
affirmative action would be required to displace the prior order. The
Supreme Court later flipped the default position by amending its
rules to provide that "no order of disbarment will be entered except
with the concurrence of a majority of the justices participating,"
granted Isserman's petition for rehearing, set aside the disbarment,
and discharged the rule to show cause.60
Fortunately, the difficulty of framing the question and deciding
what constitutes affirmative judicial action are readily avoided
when exercising appellate jurisdiction. As Justice Field explained:
In cases of appeal or writ of error in this court, the appellant or
plaintiff in error is always the moving party. It is affirmative
action which he asks. The question presented is, shall the
58. In re Isserman, 345 U.S. 286, 287 (1953). The vote was four-to-four, with Justice
Clark not participating, and Chief Justice Vinson supporting disbarment. Id. at 286, 290.
59. Id. at 290.
60. In re Isserman, 348 U.S. 1,1 (1954). The vote was four-to-three, with neither Justice
Clark, nor the new Chief Justice, Earl Warren, participating. Id. at 1-2. Sometimes, the
legislature provides an alternative procedure for handling equal divisions in courts exercising
original jurisdiction. In 1793, Congress reduced the burden of circuit riding on the Justices
by permitting circuit courts (which at that time were mostly trial courts) to include one
rather than two Justices. Act of Mar. 7, 1793 § 1, 1 Stat. 333. Since the circuit court would
then generally consist of two judges (a Justice and the local district judge), Congress provided
that if the local district judge and the Justice disagreed upon fimal hearing or on a plea to the
court's jurisdiction, the case would be continued until the next term of the circuit court. If
the district judge persisted in his view, and a different Justice agreed with the first Justice,
judgment would be entered in accordance with the view of the Justices. Id.§ 2. In effect, the
two Supreme Court Justices, sitting at different times, were empowered to outvote the local
district judge. In 1802, Congress provided for a divided circuit court to certify the question
to the Supreme Court. Act of Apr. 29, 1802, § 6, 2 Stat. 156.
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judgment, or decree, be reversed? If the judges are divided, the
reversal cannot be had, for no order can be made. The judgment
of the court below, therefore, stands in full force. It is, indeed,
the settled practice in such case to enter a judgment of
affirmance; but. this is only the most convenient mode of
expressing the fact that the cause is finally disposed of in
conformity with the action ... below, and that that court can
proceed to enforce its judgment. The legal effect would be the
same if the appeal, or writ of error, were dismissed.61
61. Durant v. Essex Co., 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 107, 112 (1868). It might be objected that
issuing a judgment of affirmance is itself an affirmative act and that the only thing an
equally divided Court should do is hold the case indefinitely. Indeed, prior to the Judiciary
Act of 1925, the Supreme Court routinely carried cases over from one term to the next, and
the practice of the Marshall Court was to carry constitutional cases from term to term
("except in cases of absolute necessity") unless "a majority of the whole court" concurred in
opinion. Briscoe v. Commonwealth Bank of Kentucky, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 118, 121 (1834); see
David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: Contracts and Commerce, 1836-
1864, 1983 DUKE L.J. 471,473 (noting that as "the absences of Justices Gabriel Duvall and
William Johnson increased, three major constitutional cases were deferred due to inability
to muster a majority of the full Court"); see also Charles Warren, The Charles River Bridge
Case, 3 GREEN BAG 2D 78, 88-91 (1999), reprint from 20 GREEN BAG 284 (1908) (noting the
way in which absences repeatedly delayed resolution of the case).
Since the Judiciary Act of 1925, the Supreme Court has prided itself on not carrying cases
from one term to the next. Indeed, its boast in this regard may have played a role in
defeating Roosevelt's Court-packing plan. See Hartnett, supra note 33, at 1731 n.489
(discussing a letter from Charles Evans Hughes to Burton K. Wheeler from Mar. 21, 1937,
which noted that the "Supreme Court is fully abreast of its work," and has "been able for
several terms to adjourn after disposing of all the cases which are ready to be heard").
Moreover, Congress has plainly indicated that the Court should affirm. by an equally divided
Court rather than hold a case indefinitely. It has provided that if any case before the
Supreme Court, other than a direct appeal
cannot be heard and determined because of the absence of a quorum of qualified
justices, if a majority of the qualified justices shall be of opinion that the case
cannot be heard and determined at the next ensuing term the court shall enter
its order affirming the judgment of the court from which the case was brought
for review with the same effect as upon affirmance by an equally divided court.
28 U.S.C. § 2109 (2000). Perhaps this statute suggests that the Court should hold a case if
the equal division is caused by a vacancy that will be filled or an absence that will be
remedied at the next term, but it strongly suggests that the Court should not hold a case
upon equal division beyond the next ensuing term.
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III. THE UNNECESSARY CONFUSION THAT WOULD RESULT FROM
ALTERNATIVE RULES FOR HANDLING AN EQUAL DIVISION
Professors Reynolds and Young nevertheless used the Isserman
case as the lynchpin of a proposal to develop alternatives to the rule
of affirmance by an equally divided Court. 2 They viewed Isserman
as illustrating that a court "can ... [choose] to accord affirmative
significance to an equal division," and that it should do so by
considering "the wealth of ... policies that bear on a principled
choice of rules for dealing with equal division.""3 They argued that,
in the appellate context, sometimes "[the] policies supporting
reversal may outweigh those supporting affirmance," In partic-
ular, they suggested that where a lower court held a federal statute
unconstitutional, an evenly divided Supreme Court should reverse,
due to the presumption of constitutionality, 5 and that an equal
division in a criminal case should result in reversal of a conviction.66
Reynolds and Young's proposal is based on a misunderstanding
of Isserman. Isserman is not a case in which a court gave
"affirmative action to [an] equal division."6 7 Instead, it is a case in
which the equal division prevented the Court from taking the
"affirmative action" of displacing its prior order. This may seem
excessively formalistic, and indeed it illustrates the difficulty of
framing the question and deciding what constitutes affirmative
judicial action. Yet Reynolds and Young's proposal perversely seeks
to introduce those difficulties into appellate jurisdiction where they
can, and long have been, successfully avoided.
The needless complexities of their proposal are perhaps best
illustrated by their treatment of conflicts between their proposed
rules; that is, "What should be done when the Court divides on the
62. William L. Reynolds & Gordon G. Young, Equal Divisions in the Supreme Court:
History, Problems, and Proposals, 62 N.C. L. REV. 29, 44-46 (1983).
63. Id. at 45.
64. Id. at 46.
65. Id. at 50. If state, rather than federal, action were involved, they favored the existing
rule of affirmance, reasoning that the presumption of constitutionality and the principles of
federalism cancel each other out. Id. at 51. If federal executive action were involved, they
called on the Supreme Court "to work out a useful set of presumptions ... on a case by case
basis." Id. at 50.
66. Id. at 51-52.
67. Id. at 45.
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constitutionality of a federal statute challenged on constitutional
grounds by a criminal defendant 8 Here, in trying to establish a
meta-rule for deciding between their two proposed rules about how
to resolve ties, they themselves divide equally, with one thinking
that the presumption of constitutionality should outweigh the
presumption in favor of criminal defendants and the other thinking
that the balance comes out the other way.69 It is not hard to imagine
that Justices adopting their proposal would sometimes be similarly
divided. One might think that Reynolds and Young would then
articulate a meta-meta-rule to resolve ties about how to resolve
conflicts about how to resolve ties. But they don't. Instead, they
revert to the academic version of the no affirmative action doctrine:
"The authors, being divided evenly here, cannot make a recommen-
dation on this issue."70
Admittedly, conflicts between different tie-breaking rules could
be avoided if only a single exception were made to the rule of
affirmance by an equally divided Court. Perhaps the best candidate
for such a single exception would, in accordance with the "death is
different" jurisprudence, be an exception for death penalty cases.7'
Congress, utilizing its power to make "regulations" regarding the
Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction,72 or the Court, utilizing its
rule-making power,73 might provide that a tie vote on the merits of
a death penalty case results in either a reversal or affirmance,
depending on which outcome benefits the convict. As unseemly as
an execution based on a tie vote in the Supreme Court may be,
however, our capital punishment regime tolerates more unseemly
results, such as permitting a single judge to override the unanimous
recommendation of a twelve-member jury and impose a sentence of
68. Id. at 52.
69. Id. at 52-53.
70. Id. at 53 n. 105.
71. See Note, The Rhetoric of Difference and the Legitimacy of Capital Punishment, 114
HARV. L. REV. 1599,1599, 1601,1619-22 (2001) (tracing the history of"death is different" and
questioning both its correctness and wisdom); see also Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker,
Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital
Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 436 (1995) (suggesting that increased procedural
protections in death penalty cases may result in increased public acceptance of the death
penalty).
72. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
73. 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (2000).
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death.7 Moreover, a special rule for tie votes in capital cases may
invite others to seek similar rules for their favored cases, whether
involving the power of the national government, state sovereign
immunity, deportation, termination of parental rights, or
affirmative action.
IV. THE FOLLY OF SWITCHING VOTES TO AVOID AN EQUAL DmSION
Professor Baker, as a solo author, does not confront the equal
division faced by Professors Reynolds and Young. Nor does he
suggest such a complex scheme. Instead, he takes a different tack.
He proposes that one Justice should simply change his or her vote,
noting that Justices have "not infrequently sublimated theirjudicial
egos, suppressed their individual voices, [and] voted against
themselves ... in particular cases, out of respect for the Court as an
institution."5 It is certainly true, as Baker notes, that Justices have
frequently suppressed dissents or separate concurrences and
acquiesced in the Court's opinion and judgment.76 But Baker's
suggestion elides several important distinctions. To evaluate his
suggestion, I believe it is important to analyze separately several
different situations in which Justices might suppress their
individual voices. In doing so, it is also important to bear in mind
the difference between judgments and opinions.
The fundamental job of a court is to decide cases by issuing
judgments; the fundamental job of a judge on a multimember court
is to vote on the judgment to be entered by that court. Opinions are
simply explanations of those judgments or those votes on
judgments. Indeed, cases are frequently decided without any
opinion at all.77
74. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447,457-65 (1984); cf Ring v. Arizona, 122 S. Ct. 2428
(2002) (holding that a jury must make all findings necessary to expose a defendant to a death
sentence).
75. Baker, supra note 11, at 136.
76. See id. at 136-37.
77. See Edward A. Hartnett, A Matter of Judgment, Not a Matter of Opinion, 74 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 123 (1999). Although it is appropriate for the Supreme Court to decline, as it usually
does, to issue any opinion when affirming by an equally divided Court, there is no obligation
to so decline. See id. at 133 n.55; see also Durant v. Essex Co., 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 107, 113
(1868) (observing that the notation of equal division "serves to explain the absence of any
opinion in the cause"). A judgment of affirmance is, after all, a judgment, and an opinion
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Consider a case in which all of the Justices agree on the
judgment. They might simply enter that judgment without opinion.
Alternatively, they might each deliver individual opinions ex-
plaining their votes for that judgment. Since John Marshall's day,
however, the tradition in the Supreme Court of the United States
has been to attempt to forge an Opinion of the Court, a single
opinion explaining the Court's judgment.
Some measure of compromise, accommodation, and suppression
of individual voices is inherent in the creation of an Opinion of the
Court, but it is compromise, accommodation, and suppression of
individual voices regarding the reasons for the judgment, not
regarding the judgment itself. Of course, sometimes the attempt
fails, and the Justices deliver multiple opinions providing different
explanations for the judgment. Whether the attempt to forge an
Opinion of the Court succeeds or fails, however, the judgment
entered by the Court is the same.
Next, consider a case in which a majority of Justices, but not all,
agree on the judgment and can forge an Opinion of the Court. The
Justices in the majority are in the same position as the Justices in
first casejust discussed, attempting to reach, if possible, an Opinion
of the Court. A justice who is outvoted can choose to deliver a
dissenting opinion explaining her vote, or she can publicly note her
dissent without opinion. She can also choose to do neither of these,
deciding instead to accept the majority's decision without dissent.
Such suppression of dissent used to be common in the Supreme
Court of the United States.7" Chief Justice Marshall stated, "it is]
my custom, when I have the misfortune to differ from this Court,
explaining that judgment, or one's vote on that judgment, is therefore not a forbidden
advisory opinion. See, e.g., Biggers v. Tennessee, 390 U.S. 404, 404 n.1 (1968) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (noting cases regarding "the practice of Justices setting forth their views in a case
where the judgment is affirmed by an equally divided Court"). The dominant practice of
declining to issue opinions in such cases may be designed to avoid having the opinion
supporting the judgment of afrumance treated as precedent, see Durant, 74 U.S. at 113
(observing that the notation of equal division "prevents the decision from becoming an
authority for other cases of like character"), especially considering that the doctrine refusing
to give precedential effect to judgments affirmed by equally divided courts was a departure
from the common law of England. See Wallace, Krebs note, supra note 38, at 862.
78. See John P. Kesh, The Opinion Deliuery Practices ofthe United States Supreme Court
1790-1945, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 137 (1999) (tracing the evolution of judicial attitudes toward
writing separately from the Opinion of the Court).
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[to] acquiesce silently in its opinion. "79 Justice Story similarly noted
that "the course which I have generally pursued, when I have had
the misfortune to differ from my brethren" is to "maintain
silence."80 Although expressions of dissent on the Court became
more common as time passed,"1 Professor Robert Post's recent
study makes clear that a norm of acquiescence persisted until the
time of the Taft Court. Justices who were outvoted would rou-
tinely defer to the majority's judgment and keep their contrary
view quiet from the public. 2 Post points to numerous internal
documents in which Justices indicated that they continued to
disagree with the majority but would nevertheless "in silence
acquiesce, " "acquiesce for the sake of harmony,"84 "shut up," 5 stay
mum,
"86 or "have nothing to say.
" s7
Notice that these remarks suggest a distinction between
concurring with or joining the majority, on the one hand, and
silently acquiescing on the other. As Justice Sutherland once said
in response to a draft of an opinion by Justice Holmes, "I regret that
I cannot concur but shall not dissent."" The norm of acquiescence
seems to have vanished, and taken that distinction along with it.
Indeed, under current practice, a Justice who is inclined to suppress
79. Bank of the United States v. Dandridge, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 64,90 (1827) (Marshall,
C.J., dissenting).
80. Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 257,328 (1837) (Story, J., dissenting)
(noting, however, that this practice did not apply to constitutional questions).
81. See Kelsh, supra note 78, at 138-39.
82. See Robert Post, The Supreme Court Opinion as Institutional Practice: Dissent, Legal
Scholarship, and Decisionmaking in the Taft Court, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1267, 1344 (2001)
("What is fascinating about these various [internal Court] communications is that they do
not so much express a 'norm of consensus,' as a norm of acquiescence.") (footnote omitted).
83. Id. at 1340 (quoting Stone Papers, referring to France v. French Overseas Corp., 277
U.S. 323 (1928)).
84. Id. at 1341 (quoting Stone Papers, referring to Standard Oil Co. v. Marysville, 279
U.S. 582 (1929)).
85. Id. (quoting Holmes Papers, referring to Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Southwell, 275
U.S. 64 (1927)).
86. Id. at 1343 (quoting Holmes Papers, referring to Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260
U.S. 22 (1922)).
87. Id. (quoting Holmes Papers, referring to Gardner v. Chi. Title & Trust Co., 261 U.S.
453 (1923)).
88. Id. at 1342-43 (quoting Holmes Papers, referring to Am. Ry. Express Co. v. Levee, 263
U.S. 19 (1923)); cf United States v. Vallejo, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 541, 555 (1861) (Grier, J.,
dissenting) ("I cannot consent, by my silence, that an inference should be drawn that I concur
in the opinion just delivered.").
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a dissent cannot simply acquiesce silently, but instead is described
as formally "joining" the Opinion of the Court.89
Yet even if the difference between changing one's vote to publicly
join the majority and simply acquiescing in silence is regarded as
too subtle, and all suppressed dissent treated as if an outvoted
Justice switched her vote regarding the judgment, the switch does
not change the judgment.90
Notice that sometimes a majority of Justices agree on the
judgment but cannot forge an Opinion for the Court, and dissenting
opinions, rather than being suppressed, reveal that the separate
rationales supporting the majority judgment are each rejected by a
majority of the Court. In a reflection of the primacy of judgments
over opinions, the traditional and still general practice is simply to
tolerate the seeming paradox and enter the judgment on which a
majority agrees."' However, on rare occasions-two have been
identified in the Supreme Court's history, and one of the two has
been overruled 92-a Justice switched his vote on the judgment in an
89. Rory K. Little, Reading Justice Brennan: Is There a "Right" to Dissent?, 50 HASTINGS
L.J. 683, 696 n.52 (1999) (noting that "prior to the 1970 Term, the official U.S. reports did
not list who 'joined' in the majority opinion," and that while "our shared understanding of the
meaning ofjudicial silence [may have] changed over time," "today, not dissenting is generally
perceived as 'joining'"). The practice of formally "joining" an opinion has also spawned a
troubling practice whereby dissenting Justices join, but only in part, an opinion supporting
the Court's judgment that would not otherwise be an "Opinion of the Court," and thereby
purport to make that opinion an "Opinion of the Court.' See, e.g., Williams v. Taylor, 529
U.S. 362 (2000) (denominating Justice O'Connor's opinion in relevant part as the "Opinion
of the Court" even though it achieved majority status only by counting dissenting Justices
who joined these parts); see also MARTIN H. REDISH & SUZANNA SHERRY, FEDERAL COURTS:
CASES, COMmENTS AND QUESTIONS 713 (5th ed. 2002) (asking whether "dissenting Justices
[should] be able to cast the deciding votes in a dispute among the majority in this way"); B.
Rudolph Delson, Note, Typography in the U.S. Reports and Supreme Court Voting Protocols,
76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1203 (2001) (examining the influence of "outline-style formatting" of
opinions on Justices' strategic behavior).
There are two remnants of silent acquiescence. First, Justices rarely make public note of
disagreement with a decision to grant or deny certiorari. Second, when the court issues an
opinion per curiam, the Justices who constitute the majority are not separately listed. See,
e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
90. It is consistent, then, with what Evan Caminker calls the "hard disposition
constraint" on strategic voting. Evan Caminker, Sincere and Strategic Voting Norms on
Multimember Courts, 97 MICH. L. REv. 2297, 2336 (1999).
91. See Hartnett, supra note 77, at 134-36.
92. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279,313-14 (1991); Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,
491 U.S. 1, 56-57 (1989), overruled by Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
Fulminante was a death penalty case, and Justice Kennedy's decision to switch his vote in
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attempt to avoid the paradox. Although some scholars have praised
these decisions and called for the Justices to engage more
frequently in what has become known as issue-voting,93 others have
defended the traditional practice.9 I am among the latter group,
having previously argued that these two cases are unwise
anomalies and that the traditional practice of outcome-voting on the
judgment better accords with the fundamental role of courts to
decide cases by issuing judgments.9" Although it may, of course, be
mere coincidence, there has not been a vote switch in the Supreme
Court since the scholarly commentary on those two cases.96
that case may have been influenced by that fact. In explaining his decision, Justice Kennedy
wrote:
In the interests of providing a clear mandate to the Arizona Supreme Court in
this capital case, I deem it proper to accept in the case now before us the
holding of five Justices that the confession was coerced and inadmissible. I
agree with a majority of the Court that admission of the confession could not be
harmless error when viewed in light of all the other evidence; and so I concur
in the judgment to affirm the ruling of the Arizona Supreme Court.
Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 313-14 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Although Mr. Fulminante
obviously benefitted from Justice Kennedy's vote switch, it is far from clear that capital
defendants more generally did, since the Fulminante case thereby produced a majority
opinion stating that a coerced confession could be harmless. See Hartnett, supra note 77, at
145 (discussing Fulminante).
93. See, e.g., Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, The One and the Many:
Adjudication in Collegial Courts, 81 CAL. L. REv. 1, 30-31 (1993); David Post & Steven C.
Salop, Rowing Against the Tidewater: A Theory of Voting by Multkjudge Panels, 80 GEO. L.J.
743, 745 (1992).
94. See, e.g., John M. Rogers, 'I Vote This Way Because I'm Wrong": The Supreme Court
Justice as Epimenides, 79 KY. L.J. 439, 442 (1991).
95. Hartnett, supra note 77, at 142.
96. Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (1998), seemed to present such a paradox. Although
a majority of the Court rejected the separate rationales supporting a majority judgment, no
Justice switched a vote. See Maxwell L. Stearns, Should Justices Ever Switch Votes?: Miller
v. Albright in Social Choice Perspective, 7 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 87, 155 (1999) (suggesting the
possibility that Justices O'Connor and Kennedy viewed the overruling of Union Gas "as a
criticism of the practice of vote switching"). Miller may represent another example of the
wisdom of the traditional rule: The majority in Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001), adopted
the rationale that appeared to be rejected by a majority in Miller. Therefore, even ifa Justice
had switched votes in order to avoid the paradox, the decision in Miller might have met the
same fate as Union Gas. Cf Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell L. Stearns, Beyond Counting
Votes: The Political Economy of Bush v. Core, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1849, 1883-84 (2001)
(suggesting that in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices
Scalia and Thomas accepted Bush's equal protection argument and Justices O'Connor and
Kennedy did not reach Bush's Article 11 argument, in order to avoid revealing the paradox
of Bush winning the judgment even though he lost each issue).
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Sometimes, however, there will simply not be a majority favoring
any judgment. This can happen either (1) because the Court is split
into three (or more) factions regarding the judgment, none of which
commands a majority, or (2) because there are an even number of
Justices who divide evenly. Longstanding Supreme Court practice
has treated these two situations differently. In the case of a three-
way split, a Justice switches her vote on the judgment in order to
create a majority disposition. In the case of a even division, on the
other hand, the judgment is affirmed by an equally divided Court.
Professor Baker effectively seeks to have the two situations
treated the same way, arguing that a Justice on the equally divided
Court should switch her vote just as a Justice in the three-way split
switches her vote. He does not, however, provide any criteria for
deciding which side of the court should yield, and no good answer
is apparent. Although there is no explicit doctrine governing the
situation of a three-way split, there is at least some clear pattern:
(1) a faction that sincerely believes the Court lacks jurisdiction
switches to a merits-based disposition; or
(2) a faction that sincerely believes the judgment ought to be
affirmed or reversed switches to a disposition calling for some
sort of remand. In no case did a faction switch to a jurisdictional
dismissal or switch away from a remand to an outright
affirmance or reversal.97
Neither of these principles would be of any help to a Court that is
equally divided between affirmance and reversal.
Consider the target of Professor Baker's criticism, the Free case
itself.98 Assume that the four Justices who supported affirmance of
the judgment were Justices Stevens, Souter, Breyer, and Ginsburg
and the four favoring reversal were Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy. Which of these Justices
should change their vote, and on what basis?
Suppose Justice Breyer had switched in Free, thus establishing
a five-to-three precedent-let's call it Free' . Suppose further that
the Court, without any change in membership, thereafter confronts
a petition for certiorari presenting the same issue, but in a case in
97. Caminker, supra note 90, at 2316 n.52.
98. See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
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which Justice O'Connor is not recused. At conference, Justice
O'Connor votes to grant certiorari, saying that she thinks Free' was
wrongly decided and would have voted with Justices Stevens,
Souter, and Ginsburg in that case were she not recused. Chief
Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy
might say that this issue is settled, should not be revisited, and vote
to deny certiorari. Baker presumably would think this is the right
result; the Court should treat the matter as settled, even if settled
wrongly.99
Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, however, might respond
that this is not an ordinary situation in which a Justice should
adhere to precedent with which he or she disagrees, because to deny
certiorari would be to leave in place a decision that they now know
not only lacks majority support today, but lacked majority support
in the Court as a whole on the day it was written. Suppose they
vote to grant certiorari, so that under the rule of four, certiorari is
granted, regardless of Justice Breyer's vote on the certiorari
petition.
At conference after oral argument, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and
Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy vote to affirm on the
authority of Free', whereas Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and
O'Connor vote to reverse, contending that FreeI was wrongly
decided. Now what is Justice Breyer to do? Should he adhere to his
vote switch in Free', or should he switch back to his original
position in Free? Neither choice seems terribly attractive. Justice
Breyer now knows, not only that a majority at T2 thinks the
decision made by a majority at T1 got the law wrong, but also that
a majority of the members of the Court at T1 thought that the
decision at T1 got the law wrong, although this information was
hidden from the Justices because one of them was recused. If he
adheres to his vote switch in Free', he casts the deciding vote in a
five-to-four decision against the party who should win under (1) his
99. The epigraph of Baker's article is: "It is usually more important that a rule of law be
settled, than that it be settled right." Baker, supra note 11 at 129 (quoting DiSanto v.
Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 42 (1927) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). Indeed, this comment by
Justice Brandeis concerned the importance of adhering to precedent already established, not
the importance of establishing precedent in the first place. It should also be noted, however,
that Brandeis was dissenting from a judgment that relied on precedent; he urged the
rejection of that precedent as a guide. Disanto, 273 U.S. at 42 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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independent view of the law; (2) the majority view of the law at T2;
and (3) the (unrevealed) majority view of the law at T1. Yet if he
instead returns to his independent view of the law, the result is a
five-to-four overruling of a five-to-three decision, with a loss of
whatever certainty his original switch was supposed to provide.
Worse, he created this dilemma for himself by switching his vote in
the first place. Might he not find himself thinking, "I would never
have switched my vote had I known that Sandra would vote our
way?"
Now rewind to the point when Justice Breyer is contemplating
whether to switch his vote in the first place. He is considering
switching his vote in order to resolve the issue definitively, but then
starts to contemplate the scenario sketched out above. He may hope
that his colleagues would not put him in that position, but he
cannot be sure. Is there any way he could avoid it? Sure there is: by
knowing how Justice O'Connor would decide the issue.
This, then, suggests one possible criterion for deciding which side
of the Court should yield in order to avoid an equal division: the
side that predicts it would lose if the missing Justice were present
should yield. In some instances, of course, such a prediction will be
nearly impossible, as when a vacant seat on the Court has not yet
been filled. This is not a sufficient objection, however, because in
other instances, as when a Justice is recused, there may well be a
fairly reliable basis for making such a prediction. Even apart from
any informal discussions with each other, Justices learn a lot about
how the other Justices think. They not only read each other's
published opinions, they read each other's draft opinions and
memos about those draft opinions. They also hear each other speak
in conference, both regarding petitions for certiorari and on the
merits. Indeed, in their role as Circuit Justices, they are frequently
called upon to predict how other Justices would vote on both
petitions for certiorari and on the merits. As then-Associate Justice
Rehnquist once put it:
[A]s has been noted before in many Circuit Justices' opinions,
the Circuit Justice faces a difficult problem in acting on a stay.
The Justice is not to determine how he would vote on the merits,
but rather forecast whether four Justices would vote to grant
certiorari when the petition is presented, predict the probable
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outcome of the case if certiorari were granted, and balance the
traditional stay equities. All of this requires that a Justice
cultivate some skill in the reading of tea leaves as well as in the
process of legal reasoning.I°°
Such skills could serve them well if they were to contemplate
switching votes in order to avoid an equally divided Court by
predicting the likely vote of their missing colleague.
The obvious problem with this approach, however, is that in the
cases where it could be most useful-that is, where a Justice is
recused-it would go a long way toward undermining the recusal
itself. Perhaps it would not completely undermine the recusal,
because the sitting Justices could base their prediction of their
absent colleague's views on what she had written and said outside
the context of the case in which her impartiality might reasonably
be questioned. But it would nevertheless give rise to the temptation
to obtain, directly or indirectly, the missing Justice's views of the
case.
Far better, it seems to me, is to adhere to the longstanding
practice of affirmance by an equally divided Court and to wait for
another case to present the issue for resolution.
Recall that an equal division is not the only instance in which
there is lack of a majority favoring any judgment. Sometimes the
Court is split into three (or more) factions regarding the judgment,
none of which commands a majority, and in these situations, a
Justice does switch her vote on the judgment in order to break the
impasse and create a majority disposition.10' While Baker has
argued for treating equal divisions the way judgment impasses are
treated, Professor Evan Caminker has observed that perhaps
judgment impasses should be treated the way equal divisions are
treated, by creating a rule of "affirmed by a deadlocked Court." 2
100. Bd. ofEduc. v. Supreme Court, 448 U.S. 1343,1347 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice 1980).
101. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
102. Caminker, supra note 90, at 2315 n.51. Although noting the possibility, Caminker
also explicitly states that he is not addressing whether this would be a "wise procedural
innovation." Id.; see also Saul Levmore, Ruling Majorities and Reasoning Pluralities, 3
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 87, 95-96 (2002) (describing the "formal rule in federal courts in
the United States" as requiring that "a majority must agree on the disposition of the instant
case (so that on a three-judge appellate panel, the judges cannot split 1-1-1 as to afrmiing,
reversing, and remanding the decision below)"); cf id. at 95 & n. 14 (stating that the "general
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In evaluating the possibility of creating such a rule, it is
worthwhile to consider separately its strong version and its weak
version. Consider, first, the strong version of such a rule: Just as I
have argued that a Justice should not switch votes in order to avoid
an equally divided Court, but instead should simply accept the
equal division and the resulting affirmance, an advocate of the
strong version of an "affirmed by a deadlocked Court" rule would
argue that Justices should not switch votes to avoid a judgment
impasse, but instead should simply accept the impasse and the
resulting affirmance.
Bush v. Gore' 3 illustrates the mischief that such an innovation
could cause. Professors Michael Abramowicz and Maxwell Stearns
have persuasively argued that the Justices in Bush v. Gore may
have faced a judgment impasse, with two Justices favoring
affirmance, three favoring reversal, and four favoring remand.'04 To
complicate matters still further, the four favoring a remand
disagreed about the appropriate nature of the remand, with two
supporting an empty remand and two supporting a meaningful
remand.'0 5 In order to decide the case under current practice,
someone had to switch in order to create a majority. As noted
earlier, 6 the clear pattern in such situations is that a faction that
sincerely believes that the judgment ought to be affirmed or
reversed switches to some sort of remand.
The two possibilities, then, were for those favoring reversal to
switch to a remand, or for those favoring affirmance to switch to a
remand. Moreover, since there were two different possible remands
in play, either those favoring reversal were going to switch to the
empty remand, or those favoring affirmance were going to switch to
practice is to regard such a divided vote as no decision at all" and noting the possibility of
imagining, at "the risk of slight confusion or inaccuracy... that a 1-1-1 vote will leave things
as they are, in effect affirming the lower court").
103. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
104. Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 96, at 1942-43.
105. The terms "empty" and "meaningful" are used in an attempt to express concisely the
difference between the remand favored by Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, pursuant to
which the Florida Supreme Court was given no choice but to end the recount, Bush, 531 U.S.
at 98, and the remand favored by Justices Souter and Breyer, pursuant to which the Florida
Supreme Court would have been permitted to continue the recount under uniform standards,
if it concluded that Florida law privileged a more accurate vote count over meeting the safe
harbor date. Id. at 144-45 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
106. See supra text accompanying note 97.
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the meaningful remand. With only two favoring affirmance,
however, the only hope for a majority in favor of a meaningful
remand was to convince not only those two to switch from
affirmance to meaningful remand, but also to convince at least one
of the two favoring an empty remand to switch to a meaningful
remand. Following this speculative line of thought to its conclusion,
it would seem that when Justices Souter and Breyer failed to
convince either Justice Kennedy or Justice O'Connor to switch to a
meaningful remand, that possibility collapsed, and the majority was
formed by the three favoring reversal switching to the empty
remand.'07
Notice what would have happened if the Court operated under
the strong version of the "affirmed by a deadlocked Court" rule:
Even though only two of the nine Justices favored affirming the
judgment of the Florida Supreme Court, they would have prevailed.
As hard as it has been for many to accept the Supreme Court's
decision in Bush v. Gore, imagine the difficulty people would have
faced accepting the idea that the Florida judgment was affirmed
even though seven of the nine Justices thought it should not be.
As a second example, imagine another case like Beazley, in which
a defendant who was a minor at the time of the crime was
sentenced to death. Suppose that three Justices conclude that the
Eighth Amendment bars any such executions and therefore vote to
reverse. Suppose further that four Justices conclude that the Eighth
Amendment does not create a categorical rule barring any such
execution, but that the jury instructions at the defendant's trial did
not adequately permit the jury to take the defendant's age into
account and therefore vote to remand for a new trial. Finally,
suppose that two Justices conclude that the Eighth Amendment
imposes no relevant limit and therefore vote to affirm. A strong
version of an "affirmed by a deadlocked Court" rule would require
that no Justice switch his or her vote to avoid the judgment
impasse, but instead simply accept the affirmance of the death
sentence. This result is so misguided that it is not only hard to see
why anyone would advocate the strong version of the suggested
rule, but it is also easy to predict that even if it were somehow
adopted, Justices would rebel at its results and evade it.
107. See Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 96, at 1947-50.
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Consider, next, the weak version: Justices should switch votes to
avoid a judgment impasse, but if they fail to do so, the result should
be "affirmed by a deadlocked Court." This is certainly better than
the strong version, and something approaching it may have been
utilized in one case where there were four votes to affirm, four to
reverse, and one to dismiss the writ of certiorari as improvidently
granted. In United States v. Jordan,°8 the Court "affirmed by an
equally divided Court" of nine Justices, with Justice Frankfurter
evidently refusing to reach the merits because of his view that the
writ of certiorari should have been dismissed as improvidently
granted. Perhaps this case should be viewed, despite the Court's
choice of language, as a judgment "affirmed by a deadlocked
Court."' 9 By using the language of equal division, however, it
seems that the Jordan Court (rightly or wrongly) did not view the
case as one of a judgment impasse, but instead as a four-to-four tie,
with Justice Frankfurter's intransigence treated, in effect, as an
abstention. Moreover, several years later, when the same situation
recurred, Justice Frankfurter, without objection, characterized the
situation as an equally divided Court." This time, however, he
switched his vote from "dismiss certiorari" to "affirm," concluding
that this was not an "undue compromise with principle.""'1
Faced with the same situation more than two decades later,
Justice Stevens viewed it as a judgment impasse. In accordance
with the usual practice of switching votes to avoid a judgment
impasse, he switched his vote, explaining that although he
preferred to dismiss certiorari, he voted to affirm "[blecause a fifth
vote is necessary to authorize the entry of a Court judgment."'
In my view, Justice Stevens has the better of Justice Frankfurter
here. The situation is better understood as presenting a judg-
ment impasse, and a vote switch is therefore appropriate. More
significant than the characterization, however, is that both Justices
ultimately reached the conclusion that a vote switch was the
appropriate way to handle the situation.
108. 342 U.S. 911 (1952).
109. Professor Evan Caminker suggested this point in commenting on a draft of this
Article.
110. Inman v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 361 U.S. 138, 141 (1959) (Frankfurter, J.).
111. Id.
112. Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. 73, 89-90 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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Even if Jordan is viewed as a singular example of "affirmed by a
deadlocked Court," it should also be viewed as a mistake that
Justice Frankfurter wisely abandoned. Justices should not be so
intransigent that they refuse to switch votes when necessary to
avoid a judgment impasse. Although any encouragement to such
intransigence that the weak version of the "affirmed by a
deadlocked Court" gives is, concededly, rather modest, I see no good
reason to give any encouragement to, or build on, the shaky reed of
Jordan that even Justice Frankfurter abandoned.
V. THE SPECIAL CASE OF STAYS PENDING CERTIORARI IN CAPITAL
CASES
There is one other situation in which Justices have switched their
votes. Justice Brennan once explained: "[Wihen four vote to grant
certiorari in a capital case, but there is not a fifth vote to stay the
scheduled execution, one of the five Justices who does not believe
the case worthy of granting certiorari will nonetheless vote to
stay."11 This is not the Supreme Court's current practice.114 Indeed,
the contrary practice, which permits a stay of execution to be denied
despite a grant of certiorari, now seems sufficiently embedded
that in some recent cases, four Justices voted to grant a stay of
execution, but did not all vote for certiorari."' The result was that
113. Straight v. Wainwright, 476 U.S. 1132,1134-35 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting from
denial of a stay); see also Darden v. Wainwright, 473 U.S. 928, 928-29 (1985) (Powell, J.,
concurring in the granting of the application for a stay) (explaining why he was providing the
fifth vote to grant a stay of execution); Autry v. Estelle, 464 U.S. 1, 2 (1983) (per curiam)
(stating that had the applicant for a stay "convinced four Members of the Court that
certiorari would be granted on any of his claims, a stay would issue").
114. See, e.g., Herrera v. Collins, 502 U.S. 1085, 1085 (1992) (granting certiorari but
denying a stay of execution by a five-to-four vote); Michael Mello, "In the Years When Murder
Wore the Mask of Law': Diary of a Capital Appeals Lawyer (1983-1986), 24 VT. L. REv. 583,
601 n.75 (2000) (describing Herrera's failure to get a stay from the Supreme Court but
obtaining one from a Texas state judge). In Hamilton v. Texas, 498 U.S. 908 (1990), Justice
Stevens explained: "Four Members of the Court voted to grant certiorari and to stay the
execution. Nevertheless, the stay application was denied, and Smith was executed on
schedule. Smith's execution obviously mooted this case. The Court has therefore properly
denied the petition for a writ of certiorari." Id. at 911 (Stevens, J., concurring in denial of
certiorari).
115. See, e.g., Goodwin v. Johnson, 531 U.S. 1120 (2001) (denying a stay of execution over
four dissents; certiorari denied without indication of any dissent); Floresv. Johnson, 531 U.S.
987 (2000) (denying a stay of execution over four dissents; certiorari denied with three of the
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certiorari was denied and the embarrassment of granting certiorari
but denying a stay of execution was avoided.
Note that the difficulty here is not so much a difficulty produced
by an equally divided Court-it occurs even when there are an odd
number of Justices participating-but rather a difficulty produced
by the rule of four. This is hardly surprising, considering that the
principle that an evenly divided Court cannot take affirmative
action is premised on majority rule, whereas the rule of four, of
course, is a nonmajority rule. 116
Professors Revesz and Karlan have argued that the Supreme
Court should, through the rulemaking process, address whether the
nonmajoritarian rule of four obligates the Court, once it grants
certiorari, to preserve its jurisdiction. 117 They contend that this
question should be addressed "divorced from the divisive influence
of an unrelated issue-the constitutionality of the death penalty."18
The difficulty with their argument is that there are myriad
equitable considerations that inform the decision to grant or
withhold a stay. Applications for stays are submitted to individual
Circuit Justices, who apply the following criteria:
First, it must be established that there is a "reasonable
probability" that four Justices will consider the issue sufficiently
meritorious to grant certiorari or to note probable jurisdiction.
Second, the applicant must persuade [the Circuit Justice] that
there is a fair prospect that a majority of the Court will conclude
that the decision below was erroneous.... Third, there must be
a demonstration that irreparable harm is likely to result from
the denial of a stay. And fourth, in a close case it may be
appropriate to "balance the equities"-to explore the relative
harms to applicant and respondent, as well as the interests of
the public at large.119
four indicating that they would grant certiorari, but the fourth not formally stating a vote
on certiorari); see also STERN ETAL., supra note 10, § 17.20.
116. See Richard L. Revesz & Pamela S. Karlan, Nonmajority Rules and the Supreme
Court, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1067, 1068 (1988).
117. Id. at 1074-81, 1133. They also acknowledge that although statutory action would be
permissible, judicial rulemaking would be preferable because of the Justices' familiarity with
the issues. Id. at 1133 n.241.
118. Id. at 1133.
119. Rostker v. Goldberg, 448 U.S. 1306, 1308 (Brennan, Circuit Justice 1980) (footnotes
omitted); see also Rubin v. United States, 524 U.S. 1301, 1301-02 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice
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The Circuit Justice may refer the application to the full Court, or
the full Court may review the action taken by the Circuit Justice.' 20
In light of these criteria, a blanket rule obliging the Court to
preserve its jurisdiction is difficult to justify. This is particularly
true once one acknowledges that such a blanket rule might require
the Court to deny a stay or to vacate a stay already granted.
Consider, for example, DeFunis v. Odegaard,121 the less famous
dry run of the famous Bakke case.122 DeFunis prevailed in the state
trial court, which ordered him admitted to the University of
Washington Law School. While he was a second-year student at the
law school, the Washington Supreme Court reversed. At that point,
nothing would have prevented the school from refusing to allow
DeFunis to continue his studies. Faced with this possibility,
DeFunis applied for a stay of the Washington Supreme Court's
judgment. Justice Douglas, as Circuit Justice, granted this
application for a stay pending certiorari, thereby leaving the state
trial court's order in force. 2 The Supreme Court granted certiorari,
but by the time the case was argued, DeFunis was in his last
quarter in law school and the Court concluded that the case was
moot.12
4
1998); Edwards v. Hope Med. Group for Women, 512 U.S. 1301, 1302 (Scalia, Circuit Justice
1994) (referring to all but the fourth criterion); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 510 U.S. 1309,
1310 (Souter, Circuit Justice 1994); California v. Am. Stores Co., 492 U.S. 1301, 1304
(O'Connor, CircuitJustice 1989); Lucas v. Townsend, 486 U.S. 1301,1304 (Kennedy, Circuit
Justice 1988). For the relevant statute, see 28 U.S.C. § 2101(f) (2000), which provides:
In any case in which the fimal judgment or decree of any court is subject to
review by the Supreme Court on writ of certiorari, the execution and
enforcement of such judgment or decree may be stayed for a reasonable time to
enable the party aggrieved to obtain a writ of certiorari from the Supreme
Court. The stay may be granted by a judge of the court rendering the judgment
or decree or by a justice of the Supreme Court ....
Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2000) ("(a) The Supreme Court ... may issue all writs necessary
or appropriate in aid of [its] jurisdiction[) and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.
(b) An alternative writ ... may be issued by a justice ... of a court which has jurisdiction.").
120. See STERN ET AL., supra note 10, §§ 17.15, 17.18.
121. 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
122. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); see also Jim Chen,
DeFunis, Defunct, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 91, 92-95 (1999) (discussing how DeFunis "has
gotten lost in the constitutional cascade of Bakke").
123. DeFunis, 416 U.S. at 315.
124. Id. at 317-19.
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If the Court were obligated, once it granted certiorari, to preserve
its jurisdiction, it would have been obligated to vacate the stay
issued by Justice Douglas. Without the stay, the law school could
have prevented DeFunis from continuing his studies, thereby
saving the case from mootness. But is preserving the Court's
jurisdiction really so important that it should override the equities
that otherwise called for permitting DeFunis to continue to attend
law school?'25
In the death penalty context, however, Congress could, and
should, determine that if the Supreme Court grants certiorari, a
stay of execution is always appropriate. Everyone agrees that death
constitutes irreparable harm, and it is not unusual to impose a
blanket rule requiring a stay in death penalty cases rather than
leave the matter to case-by-case equitable balancing. For example,
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 38 provides: "A sentence of
death shall be stayed if an appeal is taken from the conviction or
sentence." 26 In a similar vein, Justice Scalia has stated:
I will in this case, and in every capital case on direct review,
grant a stay of execution pending disposition by this Court of the
petition for certiorari. While I will not extend the time for filing
a petition beyond an established execution date, neither will I
permit the State's execution date to interfere with the orderly
processing of a petition on direct review by this Court.127
Of course, stays of execution are not automatic on collateral
review. Neither a district court nor a court of appeals, however,
may deny a stay of execution on a first habeas petition unless it can
deny the petition on the merits before the scheduled execution.128
125. Cf Garrison v. Hudson, 468 U.S. 1301, 1302 (Burger, Circuit Justice 1984) (issuing
a stay in order to avoid mooting an appeal, reasoning that the harm to the state done by
mootness outweighed a six week delay of the scheduled retrial of a prisoner "who has
remained in confinement under a life sentence" for seven years).
126. FED. R. CRmM. P. 38(a).
127. Cole v. Texas, 499 U.S. 1301, 1301 (1991) (Scalia, Circuit Justice) (citation omitted);
see also Williams v. Missouri, 463 U.S. 1301, 1301-02 (Blackmun, Circuit Justice 1983).
Justice Scalia has also stated that if the Court is likely to decide whether to grant certiorari
before the scheduled execution, he will deny the stay without prejudice. Rodriguez v. Texas,
515 U.S. 1307, 1307-08 (Scalia, Circuit Justice 1995).
128. Loncharv. Thomas, 517 U.S. 314,320 (1996) ("Ifthe district court cannot dismiss the
petition on the merits before the scheduled execution, it is obligated to address the merits
676 [Vol. 44:643
20021 TIES IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Yet even the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA) 129 contains an automatic stay provision, applicable in
those states that provide adequate counsel in state postconviction
proceedings. Under this provision, once counsel is appointed for the
state post conviction proceedings, execution "shall be stayed upon
application" to a federal court that would ultimately have habeas
jurisdiction. 3 °
Admittedly, the AEDPA also has an automatic termination
provision,1"' but one aspect of that provision plainly cries out for
repair. The automatic stay expires if (1) the prisoner fails to file a
timely federal habeas petition; (2) the prisoner formally waives the
right to pursue a federal habeas petition; or (3) a federal habeas
petition, once filed, "fails to make a substantial showing of the
denial of a Federal right or is denied relief in the district court or at
any subsequent stage of review."132 Once one of these conditions
occurs, "no Federal court thereafter shall have the authority to
enter a stay of execution in the case, unless the court of appeals
approves the filing of a second or successive application under
section 2244(b)."133
Commentators have already noted that this bar on issuance of
stays of execution "seems to suggest that even were the Supreme
Court to grant certiorari, neither it nor any other federal court
could stay an impending execution." 34 Although the AEDPA is
aimed at preventing death row inmates from abusing the judicial
process and obtaining stays of execution by repeatedly filing
and must issue a stay to prevent the case from becoming moot."); Clark v. Collins, 502 U.S.
1052, 1052 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing the denial of stay of execution where
the district court and the court of appeals both denied the petition on the merits within a day
of its filing); Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 889 (1983) (M[I]f a court of appeals is unable
to resolve the merits of an appeal before the scheduled date of execution, the petitioner is
entitled to a stay of execution to permit due consideration of the merits.").
129. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified in scattered sections of 8, 15, 18, 19, 22,
28, 42, 49, and 50 U.S.C.).
130. 28 U.S.C. § 2262(a) (2000).
131. Id. § 2262(b).
132. Id.
133. Id. § 2262(c).
134. RIcHARD H. FALLON ET AL., HART & WEcHSLER's THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 223 n.14 (Supp. 2002); see Michael MacManus, Section 2262(c) of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996: Towards the Precipice of
Unconstitutionality?, 7 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 879, 882-83, 892, 902-03 (1997).
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meritless habeas petitions, should a single district judge, by
denying habeas relief, foreclose the power of the Supreme Court to
stay the execution? Surely, if the Supreme Court grants certiorari,
the case should not be considered so abusive that the Court is
prohibited from staying the execution.
Of course, this aspect of the AEDPA could be fixed simply by
exempting the Supreme Court from its requirements. Happily,
however, a single, simple provision would fix both that narrow
problem with the AEDPA and the broader problem of stays of
execution when certiorari is granted. Congress should add the
following to 28 U.S.C. § 2101(f): "Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, a sentence of death shall be stayed if the Supreme
Court grants a petition for certiorari."
CONCLUSION
In the end, then, there is good reason to retain the clear and long-
established practice of the Supreme Court of the United States to
affirm when, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, it finds
itself evenly divided as to the judgment. Likewise, there is good
reason for the practice of switching votes to avoid a judgment
impasse, but not switching votes to avoid an equal division. Finally,
although there is good reason generally to leave the issuance of
stays pending certiorari to case-by-case equitable discretion,
Congress should provide that a sentence of death shall be stayed if
certiorari is granted.
For some who think that courts of last resort exist to answer
legal questions, the practices I defend appear burdensome.
However, the burden of occasionally waiting for another case when
a full bench is available to decide the issue is modest. But for those
who believe that even courts of last resort should first be courts, the
traditional practice of the Supreme Court of the United States
serves as a healthy reminder that the primary job of a court is to
decide cases. A court can do that job even if there are some empty
seats on the bench and even if it is evenly divided.
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